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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THOMAS W. TOLMAN and
VERLAF.TOLMAN,
Appellants
v.

Appellate Case No. 20060713-CA

LOGAN CITY and JOHN and JANE
DOES, 1-20,
Appellees

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

ARGUMENT

I. DENIAL OF REZONE WAS "REVERSE SPOT ZONING"
Point III of the Brief of Appellee, Pp. 22-32, is an attempt to justify the trial
court grant of the summary judgment upholding the City's denial of the upzoning
request of the Appellees ("Tolmans") by arguing that the denial was not "reverse
spot zoning." However, Appellee ("the City") blends the discussion of spot
zoning and illegal reverse spot zoning.
Tolmans claim that the rezone denial was unconstitutional "illegal spot
zoning" or created an "island in a sea of less restrictive uses" as those terms are
interchangeably used in the cases. This unitary concept that may be labeled
"reverse spot zoning" must be and is distinguished from spot zoning that may be
1

permissible. This distinction is extensively addressed and argued in the Brief of
Appellants ("Tolmans Brief).
The City claims that Tolmans arguments fail to comprehend the essence of
"reverse spot zoning." City Brf. 23. Those arguments reveal that it is the City that
fails to comprehend "reverse spot zoning". Tolmans have correctly characterized
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York 438 U.S. 104 (1978) by stating that
the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of "reverse spot zoning" applicable
here. Tolmans Brf. 10. In holding that New York City landmark restrictions are
legal, the court distinguishes, defines and adopts the illegal discriminatory
"reverse spot" zoning doctrine applicable in this case:
.. .landmark laws are not like discriminatory or 'reverse spot'
zoning; that is, a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a
particular parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the
neighboring ones.
A/., 438 U.S. at 132.
The analysis in Tolmans brief of case precedents leading to this U. S.
Supreme Court Penn Central reverse spot zoning doctrine are correct.
Without distinction, the City quotes and argues principles of general "spot
zoning" and then erroneously applies them to this "reverse spot" zoning context,
City Brf. 24-25, when the principles of legality and illegality of the two types are
vastly different. It is true in the context of general spot zoning that "Rezoning
individual tracts or small parcels of land will be held invalid when not enacted in
accordance with a comprehensive plan". On the other hand, as clearly established
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by Tolmans arguments, cases and the City's Rathkopf treatise quotes, the essence
of illegal "reverse spot" zoning is this: If a lot is surrounded by non-conforming
less restricted uses, the denial of a rezone to conform to the surrounding non
conforming uses is arbitrary and discriminatory "reverse spot zoning", even if the
downzoning scheme is valid and in conformity with the general plan. The City
Brief 29-30 essentially repeats this same specious argument in the context of
Tolmans cases. All of Tolmans cited cases and quotes on this point expressly or
implicitly hold that there was illegal reverse spot zoning on the basis that the
underlying downzoning schemes, including the comprehensive plans, were valid
and constitutional, unless those cases also held the downzoning schemes were
unconstitutional. Tolmans also claim unconstitutionality of the downzoning
scheme even though their claim of illegal reverse spot zoning is not dependent on
the invalidity of the scheme or plan for this reason.
The City Brief at pages 26-28 makes the disingenuous argument that the
Utah cases Tolmans claim recognize and define the illegal "reverse spot zoning"
doctrine, and distinguish and define legal "spot zoning", are irrelevant. The City
ignores the critical doctrine defining dictum of those Utah cases, which employ the
alternative terminology of a more restrictive island in a sea of less restrictive uses.
Many of the other cases employ both terms. These Utah cases correctly hold that
their facts do not fit the doctrine, for the reasons detailed in Tolmans Brief. The
unchallenged facts in this case do fit the doctrine as defined in the Utah cases.
Because these facts fit the doctrine, this will be the first Utah appellate
3

opportunity to apply the "reverse spot zoning" doctrine to case where that doctrine
fits. The City attempts to divert the court's attention from the significance of these
cases by meandering off into an irrelevant discussion of divergent facts.
On its face, the City's cited case of Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake
City, 212 P.2d 177 (Utah 1949), supports Tolmans position and cases that, unlike
non debatable reverse spot zoning where a lot is surrounded by less restrictive
uses, spot zoning a lot on the border between zones presents a debatable legislative
legal spot zone issue. City Brf 28. These boader, large tract, and less restrictive
use cases the City claims "contain case law both pro and con" (City Brf. 29), in
fact properly define and limit the application of the doctrine of reverse spot
zoning. Tolmans Brief 13-14 exhaustively explores these limitations in the context
of the Utah cases and the ALR article.

II. THE "REVERSE SPOT ZONING" ISSUE WAS PRESERVED
The City, at page 22 of its brief, inserts what it claims is a "threshold
issue," that Tolmans did not "adequately" preserve reverse spot zoning as an issue
in response to the City's motion for summary judgment. Tolmans begin their
memorandum argument with:
The City's denial of Tolmans' rezone of their single family lot to a
multi family zone, so they can use and sell it for the same multi
family uses as all his surrounding neighbors, is the most extreme
case of illegal, arbitrary and capricious denial of substantive due
process found in extensive reported case law. The controlling
principles and cases are in...73 A.L.R 5th 223 (titles and sections)
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"B. Where Parcel in Question Zoned or Rezoned More Restrictively
Than Surrounding Property... R. 210
This is the same ALR article cited by this Court as a valid source for line drawing
between legal and illegal (reverse island-in-a-sea) spot zoning in the unpublished
decision in Donner Crest Condominium Homeowners' Ass 'n v. Salt Lake City,
2005 WL 775306. Tolmans Brief 13. Tolmans memo continues by summarizing
and analyzing the application to this case of the ALR cited and analyzed cases to
this case:
Under Sec. 12 (32 Cases ) illegal spot zoning was established in
every case as this, where a single small lot was more restrictively
zoned than all the surrounding lots. Illegal spot zoning was also
established where larger tracts not completely surrounded by less
restrictive uses were present. Under Sec. 13 (28 cases), there was no
case where a small lot completely surrounded by less restrictive uses
where illegal spot zoning was not established. Every such case
turned on the large size of the tract or adjacent similarly restrictive
uses. R. 210.
Tolmans memo continues by excerpting from the Article's analysis of 14 of the 32
cases where illegal reverse spot zoning was held in analogous circumstances. This
relevant detailed additional "legal analysis" covered three plus pages of single
spaced ALR analytical excerpts.
The memo (R.14) continues with a detailed legal analysis of the application
and distinctions contained in four Utah cases that recognize the "reverse spot
zoning" doctrine expressed in terms of more restricted "island in a sea" of less
restricted uses. Tolmans Brf p. 13.
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Contrary to the City's assertion, Tolmans have provided both the court
below and this Court with ample legal analysis. The "reserve spot zoning" issue
has been well preserved as the central claim of Tolmans from the beginning.

III. THE REZONE AREA DOES NOT LIMIT TOLMANS CLAIM
The City argues on pages 24 and 25 that Tolmans have been inconsistent in
advancing their case for "reverse spot zoning." The City relies on Tolmans
application including 32 lots rather than the solitary lot owned by Tolmans. The
City questions whether the denial of a 32-lot rezone application can be the basis
for a claim that the Tolmans' lot is an island.
Tolmans unchallenged affidavit attached to the opposition memorandum
(Tolman Brf. Tab 2) provides the detail showing how he was misled by the City
Planner Michelle Meachem (Tab 2 p. 2-5) into expanding his intended one lot
application to include a large 8 acre area (the 32 lots); delaying his application for
about three months, while he got 17 additional co-petitioners owning 31 lots, and:
did an extensive survey and analysis detailing the predominant multiple uses in the
whole downzoned area (Tabs 2-3). The City planners stated purpose was not only
to improve Tolmans chances for approval of his rezone, but also to provide proof
to support and follow the Planners' promised upzone plan initiative for this area.
They failed to initiate the promised plan revision (Tab 2 pg 3 ^f 5). These facts
were summarized and included in the Statement of the Case and Statement of
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Facts in Tolmans Brief, and were never challenged by the City. This argument is
also in Tolmans memorandum. R. 215.
It would be inequitable to disregard Tolmans one lot original rezone intent
and objective that the City planners diverted him from, and deny his rezone on the
grounds that he expanded it to include 32 lots, as the City argues in its Brief (pgs.
24-25). These uncontested facts include all the requirements for zoning estoppel as
set forth in Grand County v. Rogers 44 P 3d 734 (Utah 2002) where the Utah
Supreme Court sets out the conditions, present in this case, for invoking zoning
estoppel:
"This court has recognized there are circumstances where it is
inequitable to enforce a zoning ordinance." Xanthos v. Bd. Of
Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P. 2d 1032, 1037 (Utah 1984). To
invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel in a zoning case "the
county must have committed an act or omission upon which the
developer could rely in good faith in making substantial changes in
position or incurring extensive expenses." Utah County v. Young,
615 P. 2d 1265, 1267 (Utah 1980). "The action upon which the
developer claims reliance must be of a clear, definite and affirmative
nature."
Id., at 739.
Under these circumstances it would be a grave injustice to conclude that
there would have been a valid single lot rezone but not a multiple. This result
would unfairly deny the rezone because Tolman was misled by the City into
including the additional lots. He would be compelled to begin and process a
single lot rezone application he intended to file in the first place.
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Tolmans City-prompted expansion of the application area did not change
the character of the multiple-family uses on the ground. The Appendix at Tab 3,
pages 2 and 3, shows the rezone application area, the Tolmans' lot, and the multifamily uses surrounding it. The 31 -lot expansion added 23 lots that are already in
actual multi-family use. Only seven of the additional lots are still in single-family
use, and the four islands in which they are found, are each surrounded by multiple
family uses, most of them within the expanded area. In other words, the character
of the 32-lot application was no different than the character of the single-lot
application. See Shapiro v. City of Cambridge, 340 Mass. 652, 166 N.E. 2d 208
(1960). These facts turn all the City quotes from Rathkopf s The law of Zoning
and Planning on pages 24 and 25 into powerful support for Tolmans claims that
there is "reverse spot zoning" whether the focus is on Tolmans solitary lot, or
expanded to include a few other small islands the larger sea.

IV. PALERMO, DAFU, AND CHICAGO SUPPORT TOLMANS
Tolmans Brief at pages 19-20 cited and quoted from Dafu v. Jefferson
Parish, 200 So.2d 335 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1967), as one among many cases
supporting illegal reverse spot zoning in this case. Dafu was partially abrogated
by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Palermo Land Co,. Inc. v Planning Comm 'n of
Calcasieu Parish, 200 So. 2d 482 (La. 1990), but only insofar as Dafu shifted the
burden of proof to the municipality in reverse spot zoning cases. The City claimed
that Palermo totally abrogated Dafu. City Brf. 29. The abrogation was only
8

partial, however, and Palermo confirmed all the other conclusions in Dafu.
Palermo also cited more recent Louisiana cases supporting Dafu's other reverse
spot zoning principles. In order to conform Dafu quotes to Palermo, Tolmans
agree that only the paragraph numbered 4 appearing on page 20 of their brief
should be stricken.
The City Brief at page.30 erroneously asserts that the challenge in Trust Co.
of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 96 N.E.2d 499 (111. 1951), was to "upzoning", when
in fact the challenge was to the unconstitutional "downzoning" amendment of the
original Chicago zoning plan and ordinance. This landmark Illinois case on
reverse spot zoning is on "all fours" with this case and powerfully supports
Tolmans position on all critical points.

V. THE CITY WAS POWERLESS TO DENY THE REZONE
The City argues that the trial court correctly concluded that denial of
Tolmans "DOWNZONING" application was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal.
City Brief, Point I at pages 10-13. It is critical to understanding the principles
involved in reverse spot zoning that Tolmans were denied an "upzone " (really a
recognition of the actual uses), not a "downzone " as the City repeatedly misstates.
This "DOWNZONING" denial miscue was repeated again in Point III on page 22.
The City confirms this critical misconception in the lead to its first argument on
page 11:" The City's denial of Tolmans' request for downzoning was an exercise
of legislative discretion." This repetition appears to result from a
9

misconception that the City in fact denied a "downzone" when in fact it denied an
"upzone." This misunderstanding could explain what otherwise appear to be
fundamental logic lapses and conflicts in many of the City's arguments. In this
urban context there is nothing downzonable below single family, unless it is to
pretend that the City can, by zoning, transform and revert the urban landscape to
agricultural. The "downzoning" occurred when the City, in 1989 moved the
designation from multifamily to single family.
The City cites Bradley v. Payson City Corp. 2003 UT 16, 70 P.3d 47, for
the proposition that "reasonably debatable" legislative decisions must be upheld.
The City misses the point that in Tolmans case, the decision on Tolman's
application was not reasonably debatable - the denial of it was arbitrary and
capricious, because otherwise Tolmans were deprived of the right to use their
property in the same way as their immediate neighbors. This is the conclusion
whether the "reverse spot zoning" situation takes the decision out of the legislative
realm and into the administrative, or removes the issue from legislative debate.
Either way, the denial must be reversed, and such reversal does no violence to the
principles expressed in Bradley. The peculiar facts of this case are "extreme" {See
Bradley at % 24). They are, simply, that Tolmans single family zoned lot is
surrounded on all sides by multi family non conforming uses.
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VI. TOLMANS PRESERVED THEIR TAKINGS CLAIMS
The City's argues at pages 14-20 that Tolmans have not preserved their
takings claims. The City's principal argument centers on the erroneous
assumption that the rezone denial taking and 1989 downzone taking was pursuant
to a valid fairly debatable legislative act. All of the cases the City cites and relies
on are cases that fix standards for takings and damage thresholds that only apply to
regulatory takings made pursuant to constitutional fairly debatable legislative acts
and regulations. The very different rules and standards for takings and damages
pursuant to the non-debatable, unconstitutional, arbitrary, capricious, illegal and
discriminatory rezone denial, are threaded through cases, quotes and arguments in
Tolmans Brief at pages 11 through 22. Those cases and different takings standards
are all based on findings and holdings of illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory
reverse spot zoning. They either expressly or inherently hold that takings co-exist
and occur with acts of reverse spot zoning. They hold that the requisite damages
are obvious in reverse spot zone takings acts. The excerpts from the ALR analysis
of 15 cases in Tolmans opposition memorandum (R. 211-216, pg. 13-16), includes
numerous express and inherent takings-damages findings to this same effect.
These same basic takings standards apply to the unconstitutional 1989
downzoning. Tolmans opposition memorandum at R. 215, page 17 states: "The
lions share of the City's Argument is based on the erroneous assumption that there
is no evidence that the City's denial of the rezone was arbitrary or capricious,
when, in undisputed fact and as a matter of law, it is both." This statement had
11

direct application to the City's memorandum argument for a summary judgment
on the takings issues and merit-less statute of limitations affirmative defense.
Tolmans have preserved their challenge to the City's vague statute of limitations
defense in their Brief and by the following argument in their opposition
memorandum at R. 215-16: "There is no substance nor authority cited to support
the bare claim that any statute of limitations bars this action. The cause of action is
based on the denial of his rezone application by the City Council."
The questions of standards for takings damages and proof should be left to
further trial court proceedings.

CONCLUSION
Tolmans alleged that the denial of their upzone application was
unconstitutional reverse spot zoning. Logan City's motion for summary judgment
did not provide any facts that would defeat Tolmans claims, but rather supplied
evidence that supported the existence of illegal spot-zoning, and the
unconstitutionality of the downzoning amendment in the neighborhood in 1989
that violated the original 1950 plan-ordinance. The trial court erred in ruling that,
as a matter of law, Tolmans could not possibly prove a case to support their
complaint. The trial court's dismissal should be reversed, and the case remanded
for further proceedings. In the interest of judicial economy, instructions as to Utah
law on the topic of reverse spot zoning would be helpful.
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RESPECFULLY SUBMITTED January/!, 2007.
CHRIS DAINES LAW

unes
Attorney for Appellants
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